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Why Security and Privacy Research Lies at the Centre of the Information Systems (IS) Artefact: Proposing A 
Bold Research Agenda 
ABSTRACT 
In this essay, we outline some important concerns in the hope of improving the effectiveness of 
security and privacy research. We discuss the need to re-examine our understanding of information 
technology (IT) and information system (IS) artefacts and to expand the range of the latter to include 
those artificial phenomena that are crucial to information security and privacy research. We then briefly 
discuss some prevalent limitations in theory, methodology, and contributions that generally weaken 
security/privacy studies and jeopardise their chances of publication in a top IS journal. More importantly, 
we suggest remedies for these weaknesses, identifying specific improvements that can be made and 
offering a couple of illustrations of such improvements. In particular, we address the notion of loose re-
contextualisation, using deterrence theory (DT) research as an example. We also provide an illustration of 
how the focus on intentions may have resulted in an underuse of powerful theories in security and privacy 
research, because such theories explain more than just intentions. We then outline three promising 
opportunities for IS research that should be particularly compelling to security and privacy researchers: 
online platforms, the Internet of things (IoT), and big data. All of these carry innate information security 
and privacy risks and vulnerabilities that can be addressed only by researching each link of the systems 
chain, that is, technologies–policies–processes–people–society–economy–legislature. We conclude by 
suggesting several specific opportunities for new research in these areas. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As senior academicians who have worked diligently as part of the global information system (IS) 
research community, which has struggled to enrich and promote IS research on security and privacy, there 
is one question that makes us cringe, as we frequently see it from reviewers and editors of leading IS 
journals in their responses to security and privacy manuscripts:  
‘Where is the IT artefact?’ 
Given the long history of security and privacy research in IS, we wonder why this question is still 
being asked and sometimes used as a sloppy intellectual justification for rejecting papers. Ironically, all 
three of us have experienced this, including while overseeing this special issue. Certainly, not every 
security/privacy paper addresses a meaningful information technology (IT) artefact or is relevant to IS 
research; however, if a paper deals with a substantial security or privacy problem at the organisational 
level, it is typically highly relevant, not just to IS research but to IS practice. 
Accordingly, in this editorial, we address several salient issues. First, we argue that there remains 
a fundamental misunderstanding of what the IT artefact is and of its utility in IS research. This 
misunderstanding may impede the progress of the entire IS field, not just IS security and privacy research.  
Second, there is still a misguided emphasis on the IT artefact, when the proper emphasis should 
be on the broader IS artefact.1 We are, after all, not IT but IS researchers. We sometimes wonder if 
members of our field have forgotten about or disagree on what are information systems and what is our 
role in researching them. Third, too many IS researchers have little appreciation for the fact that security 
and privacy are at the centre of the IS artefact.  
We use this editorial to propose a guide for future research, not just for security and privacy 
researchers, but also for anyone who studies the IS artefact. However, our editorial does not stop merely 
with rethinking research opportunities related to the IS artefact. We also use this occasion to outline 
                                                     
1 We expound on this shortly, but basically, we argue that for security and privacy research, this should 
include anything related to security/privacy that matters or should matter to organisational practice. It does not have 
to specifically include interactions with a computer. 
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opportunities for methodological and theoretical improvements that, if implemented, could result in more 
interesting, influential research and more effective practice. More importantly, we suggest remedies for 
these weaknesses. We identify specific improvements that can be made to security and privacy research, 
offering a couple of illustrations. In particular, we challenge the notion of loose re-contextualisation that 
has gained traction in this research and discuss the example of improving deterrence theory (DT) 
research. We also explain that the focus on intentions may have resulted in an underuse of powerful 
theories in security and privacy research, because such theories explain more than just intentions. A 
proper understanding of the IS artefact actually points to a promising future for IS security and privacy 
research—precisely because online platforms, the Internet of things (IoT), and big data provide 
compelling opportunities involving various IS artefacts. We conclude by identifying several specific 
opportunities for new research in these areas. 
2. MOVING FROM THE IT ARTEFACT TO THE IS ARTEFACT 
Next, we explain why an obsessive focus on the ‘IT artefact’ is a potentially undermining and 
misleading focus that ignores the richness of security and privacy research and practice. We then explain 
what we mean by ‘IS artefact’ and why it represents a much more promising way to frame and evaluate 
security and privacy research. 
2.1 Why the IT Artefact Is the Wrong Focus for Security and Privacy Research 
Although we believe it is time for the IS research community to move on from its excessive focus 
on the IT artefact, we commend the thinking and goals that initially drove the IT artefact discussion (e.g. 
Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001). Indeed, this movement became a focus and de facto standard in IS research 
because researchers were often attempting to publish research in IS journals in which IS was merely 
tangentially or superficially addressed, with the result that their papers were in fact psychology, social 
science, or computer science papers masquerading as IS papers. These practices created an identity crisis 
in the IS field. It was difficult to know what was and was not IS research, especially because technology 
topics were increasingly relevant in other academic fields (Benbasat & Zmud, 2003).  
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The problem that we observe, however, is that reviewers often lack a proper understanding of the 
IT artefact and interpret it with a crude, black-and-white rubric: for a study to ‘count’ as IS research, it 
must involve direct interaction with a specific information system (either hardware or software). Although 
such interaction with a physical system artefact likely represents the IT artefact, this kind of thinking can 
result in a regression to a purely positivistic view of science, where that which is unseen is overlooked or 
considered insignificant or IS phenomena are treated as though they are governed solely by natural laws. 
We agree with Whinston & Geng (2004), who argued that much of the important research in IS addresses 
the murky ‘grey areas’ in respect of the IT artefact. Likewise, we argue, it is the intangible and unseen in 
IS research and practice that often matters the most—or is at least the most interesting. We thus concur 
with Lee (1999): 
‘Clearly, if we wish our research to be relevant to practitioners, then we ought to consider doing 
our research in a way that emulates inquiry in the professions, whether in addition to or instead 
of doing research in a way that emulates inquiry in the natural sciences’ (p. 29). 
 This issue is particularly relevant to security and privacy research and practice, because its 
foundations lie in the ‘sciences of the artificial’ (Simon, 1996), that is, scientific inquiry that is not fully 
governed by natural laws because it investigates human-created artefacts; in our context, such artefacts 
include privacy violations, security threats, HIPAA noncompliance, security policies, two-factor 
authentication, encryption, and so on. Moreover, security and privacy research is interwoven with the 
constraints of human psychology, law, and professions. Here, the form of inquiry proper to the natural 
sciences is often the least relevant approach, if not irrelevant altogether, to understanding such human-
created artefacts. Pries-Heje & Baskerville (2008) noted the reality of challenging, unstructured 
managerial decisions, which we believe fit well with security and privacy research:  
‘Perhaps the apex of unstructured decision making occurs in the context of wicked problems. 
Such problems are poorly formulated, confusing, and permeated with conflicting values of many 
decision makers or other stakeholders. Because every outcome of the decision is obscure, the 
problem cannot be parted or solved piecemeal…Wicked problems share certain characteristics. 
For example, they can only be formulated in terms of a solution. Their solutions are value-laden, 
and cannot be denoted true or false, only good or bad. Their solution space is unbounded, and 
solutions are irreversible’ [emphasis added] (Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 2008, p. 731). 
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Likewise, organisational security and privacy issues are increasingly ‘wicked problems’ that call for a 
rethinking of the key artefacts involved.  
2.2 Why the IS Artefact Is the Right Focus for IS Research, and Particularly for Security and 
Privacy Research 
Security and privacy are abstract notions that exist artificially and as a result of legal, 
organisational (e.g. policy), and cultural mechanisms, which vary by jurisdiction and culture. They are 
human constructs that we choose to consider important or not. Hence, security and privacy are not even 
traditional ‘IT artefacts’ that can be mapped directly to hardware or software artefacts. And yet, it would 
seem that virtually nothing keeps CIOs awake at night more than their concerns about the security and 
privacy of their organisations’ data. These truly are ‘wicked problems’, and as such, they are better 
addressed in terms of a design–theory nexus than as phenomena governed by natural laws (e.g. Pries-Heje 
& Baskerville, 2008). Online platforms, the IoT, and big data—especially because they intersect—have 
made security and privacy even more important, such that they are now board-of-director-level and 
corporate-wide concerns. Aside from the CIO and CTO, there is an increasing cadre of C-level executives 
dedicated to these issues, such as the chief security officer and chief privacy officer. We argue that a key 
to this design approach is rethinking the design artefacts associated with security and privacy. 
To arrive at our proposition regarding the IS artefact, we take inspiration from Lee et al. (2015), 
who argued that IS design scientists should stop obsessing about the traditional IT artefact and instead 
focus more clearly on proposing and testing designs that relate to technology artefacts (e.g. hardware or 
software), information artefacts (e.g. messages), and social artefacts (e.g. a charitable act). We leverage 
this general idea and propose that it should be extended more widely—to virtually all IS research—and 
we firmly believe that security and privacy practice brings to light key artefacts that should be accounted 
for in security and privacy research. We also take inspiration from the editorial direction of EJIS itself, 
which embraces innovative contributions from a diversity of genres (Te'eni et al., 2015). 
In doing so, we share the views of Lee et al. (2015) and from Currie (2009), who maintained that 
there needs to be a better distinction between the IT artefact and its context, which could include 
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organisational, social, and environmental factors of a system’s implementation. From a security and 
privacy perspective, this refined distinction also means that important security and privacy phenomena or 
outcomes are artefacts that should be of central interest to researchers. Again, such artefacts derive from 
the ‘sciences of the artificial’, such that they are not governed by natural laws of nature but are created by 
humans and organisations (Simon, 1996). We thus believe that several additional key artefacts are highly 
relevant and should be studied in security and privacy research:  
 process artefact 
 organisation artefact 
 person artefact 
 threat artefact 
 legal artefact 
 protection artefact 
 vulnerability artefact  
 a broadly conceived social artefact, including culture 
Although not all of these artefacts apply to every subfield of IS research—threat, protection, and 
vulnerability primarily apply only to security and privacy research—we believe that the underlying 
principle of better analysis through the contextualisation of artefacts will make for better and more 
interesting IS research. Indeed, IS research that focuses solely on hardware or software considerations 
turns out to be less interesting. As an interdisciplinary field that investigates intersections between 
hardware, software, people, cultures, organisations, and information, we believe it is in these intersections 
that interesting and meaningful IS security and privacy research emerges. As further elaboration, in Table 
1 we present some key examples of security and privacy studies from the last 10 years, from which we 
have derived key IS artefacts that are relevant to security and privacy researchers. 
Table 1. Non-exhaustive Examples of IS Artefacts that are Pivotal to Security and Privacy 
Research* 
Our Proposed IS 
Artefact (Definition) 
Example of the Artefacts in Security 
or Privacy Context 
Citation Support 
Ethics artefact 
(considerations and 
decisions regarding the 
rational application of 
the morality of 
organisational 
decisions that directly 
Discourse ethics applied to information, 
security or privacy 
Myyry et al. (2009); Mingers & Walsham 
(2010); Chatterjee & Sarker (2013); Lowry et 
al. (2014); Chatterjee et al. (2015) 
Situational ethics applied to 
security/privacy; for example, personal 
rationalisations of violations or 
corporate violations of security/privacy 
rules under strain 
Myyry et al. (2009); Siponen & Vance (2010); 
Wall et al. (2016) 
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involve security or 
privacy) 
Rational morality and ethics as 
security/privacy violation deterrence 
mechanisms 
D'Arcy et al. (2009); Bulgurcu et al. (2010); 
D'arcy & Herath (2011); Li et al. (2014) 
Cross-cultural differences in 
information ethics  
Martinsons & Ma (2009); Lowry et al. (2014) 
Organisational level privacy programs 
based on ethical reasoning. 
Culnan & Williams (2009) 
Information artefact 
(phenomena involving 
the nexus between 
security/privacy and 
data, information, 
knowledge, or 
communication) 
Big data Davenport et al. (2007); Menon & Sarkar 
(2016) 
Information security policy documents 
or manuals 
Siponen & Willison (2009); Bulgurcu et al. 
(2010); Cram et al. (2017) 
Phishing email messages 
Spoofing web sites/emails 
Wright et al. (2014); Zahedi et al. (2015); 
Wang et al. (2016); Goel et al. (2017); Moody 
et al. (2017); Wang et al. (2017) 
Security warning messages Anderson et al. (2016) 
Social engineering attempts Workman (2007); Algarni et al. (2017) 
Spam Caliendo et al. (2012) 
Legal artefact 
(phenomena involving 
the nexus between 
security/privacy and 
law, regulations, 
policy, or best 
practices) 
HIPAA or PCI violations Wall et al. (2016) 
Regulatory approach to privacy Culnan & Williams (2009); Miltgen & Smith 
(2015); Wall et al. (2016) 
Theft of intellectual property or digital 
goods 
Bauer et al. (2016); Lowry et al. (2017b) 
Transnational data flows Hui et al. (2017) 
Organisational artefact 
(organisation-level 
phenomena that 
directly involve 
security/privacy as they 
affect organisations) 
Board-level IT governance of security 
and privacy strategy 
Turel & Bart (2014); Lee et al. (2016) 
 
Extra-role organisational behaviours for 
security and privacy 
Hsu et al. (2015) 
Security and risk-prevention 
investments by organisations 
Chen et al. (2011); Angst et al. (2017); 
Baskerville et al. (2017) 
Self-regulation  
Privacy policies 
Fair information practices  
Privacy assurance 
Hui et al. (2007); Tang et al. (2008); Lowry et 
al. (2012); Bansal & Gefen (2015); Gerlach et 
al. (2015); Greenaway et al. (2015); Parks et 
al. (2017) 
Top management commitment to 
security and privacy 
Standards and best practices 
Herath & Rao (2009b); Hu et al. (2012); Lee et 
al. (2016); Niemimaa & Niemimaa (2017)  
Person artefact 
(phenomena involving 
rational/irrational 
thought, dispositions, 
habit, emotion, and 
cognition involving 
information 
privacy/security) 
Behavioural economics vs rational 
decision  
Affective responses 
Angst & Agarwal (2009); Tsai et al. (2011); 
Acquisti et al. (2012); Goes (2013); Dinev et 
al. (2015); Burns et al. (2017b) 
Mindset of the cyberbully Lowry et al. (2016b); Lowry et al. (2017a) 
Mindset of the hacker Dey et al. (2012) 
Mindset of the insider vs the security 
professional 
Posey et al. (2014) 
Privacy calculus Xu et al. (2010); Keith et al. (2013); Keith et 
al. (2016); Kordzadeh & Warren (2017); 
Kokolakis (2017) 
Privacy correlates: anonymity, secrecy, 
awareness 
Dinev et al. (2013); Li & Qin (2017) 
Security awareness of employees D'aubeterre et al. (2008); D'Arcy et al. (2009) 
The brain’s response; neuroIS approach Anderson et al. (2016); Warkentin et al. (2016)  
Anonymising and sharing key security 
and privacy information between 
organisations 
Li & Qin (2017); Vance et al. (2017) 
Effective IT auditing Merhout & Havelka (2008) 
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Process artefact 
(process or procedure 
phenomena that 
involve 
privacy/security 
configuration, 
governance, or risk 
management) 
Information security management, risk 
management, and governance 
Veiga & Eloff (2007); Spears & Barki (2010); 
Tsohou et al. (2015) 
Privacy impact assessments Oetzel & Spiekermann (2014) 
Privacy/security balance with identity 
ecosystems 
Crossler & Posey (2017) 
System configuration failures Chen et al. (2011) 
Protection artefact 
(messaging, training, 
and persuasion 
phenomena designed to 
encourage individual-
level protective 
security/privacy 
behaviours) 
Fear appeals Johnston & Warkentin (2010); Boss et al. 
(2015); Johnston et al. (2015)  
Protection behaviours Dinev et al. (2009); Posey et al. (2013); Posey 
et al. (2015); Burns et al. (2017b) 
Resistance to phishing attempts Wright et al. (2014) 
SETA initiatives Luo & Liao (2007); D'Arcy et al. (2009); 
Karjalainen & Siponen (2011); Tsohou et al. 
(2015) 
Social artefact (social, 
cultural, organisational, 
and group-level 
phenomena involving 
security/privacy)  
Cultural influences on security and 
privacy behaviours  
Dinev et al. (2009); Lowry et al. (2011) 
Employee data leakage on social media Huth et al. (2013) 
Employee neutralisation and 
rationalisation of bad behaviour; 
negative social influence 
Siponen & Vance (2010); D’Arcy et al. (2014) 
Negative employee reactance against 
threatening information security 
policies 
Lowry & Moody (2015) 
 
Sense of justice and fairness in security 
and privacy policies 
Lowry et al. (2015) 
Technology artefact 
(tangible phenomena 
involving the nexus 
between 
security/privacy and 
physical computing 
equipment, software, 
networks, or interfaces) 
Computer abuse 
Physical destruction of property 
Willison & Warkentin (2013); Lowry et al. 
(2015) 
Encryption standards and applications Heikkila (2007) 
Equipment theft Veiga & Eloff (2007); Willison & Warkentin 
(2013) 
Interface design to prevent 
security/privacy issues 
Vance et al. (2015); Lowry et al. (2017a) 
Firewalls Cavusoglu et al. (2009) 
Location-based services Xu et al. (2010); Keith et al. (2013) 
Lost USB device with highly 
confidential information 
Heikkila (2007) 
Threat artefact 
(natural, unintentional, 
or intentional danger 
phenomena that have 
the potential to harm an 
organisation, system, or 
individual in respect of 
security/privacy) 
Access policy violations Vance et al. (2015) 
Click fraud Dinev et al. (2008); Chen et al. (2015) 
Data breaches  
Privacy invasions 
Culnan & Williams (2009); Choi et al. (2015); 
Angst et al. (2017); Goode et al. (2017); 
Karwatzki et al. (2017); Ozdemir et al. (2017); 
Posey et al. (2017) 
Denial-of-service attacks 
Cyberattacks 
Ransbotham & Mitra (2009); Kim et al. 
(2011); Hui et al. (2017) 
Insider threats D'Arcy et al. (2009); Warkentin & Willison 
(2009); Hu et al. (2011); Wang et al. (2015a) 
Malware and spyware 
Ransomware 
Luo & Liao (2007); Lee & Larsen (2009); 
Boss et al. (2015) 
Rootkit infection Beegle (2007) 
Vulnerability artefact 
(tangible or intangible 
weakness or gap 
Bring your own device (BYOD) Crossler et al. (2014) 
Cloud-computing adoption Paquette et al. (2010); Subashini & Kavitha 
(2011) 
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phenomena that expose 
an organisation, 
system, or individual to 
security/privacy risks) 
Hardware failure that reveals attack 
vulnerability 
Sumner (2009) 
Security/ privacy policy violations Herath & Rao (2009b); Siponen & Vance 
(2010); Hu et al. (2011); Vance et al. (2015); 
Johnston et al. (2016) 
Unpatched operating systems August & Tunca (2008) 
Untrained or careless employees Wright et al. (2014) 
Vulnerability management Chen et al. (2011); Baskerville et al. (2017) 
Risk in online information disclosures Posey et al. (2010); Gefen & Pavlou (2012); 
(2015); Wang et al. (2015b) 
*Note: Our literature examples are from the last 10 years, focusing on IS and technology journals. Aside from these 
key security/privacy artefact ideas we derived from the recent literature, we also encourage the reader to consider 
several review articles from which other IS artefacts relevant to security/privacy may be derived, including Bélanger 
& Crossler (2011); Pavlou (2011); Smith et al. (2011); Crossler et al. (2013); Willison & Warkentin (2013); Cram et 
al. (2017). 
 
A key issue we want to head off in advocating an IS-artefact view of security and privacy 
research is that these factors should not be treated as a necessary check list. That is, a valid IS security 
study should not have to exhaustively address each of these artefacts in one study, which would be 
excessive and unrealistic. Addressing one or more of these should be sufficient for a study to make a 
focused, meaningful contribution. However, the bigger issue is whether the researcher is addressing a 
security or privacy issue that organisations care about or would care about if they knew better.  
3. OTHER ASPECTS OF GOOD PRIVACY/SECURITY RESEARCH 
Clearly, a security or privacy study is not appropriate for a top IS journal merely because it 
properly addresses an important IS artefact. Other consistent standards still apply. Before we send 
security and privacy papers out for review at our journals, we first ask questions like the following: Is 
there native IS theory development or original contextualisation of an outside theory? Are the findings 
novel, surprising, and exciting? Will the findings, if widely disseminated, likely change the way 
researchers look at the problem going forward, and do the findings provide an opportunity to improve 
practice? Are the methods well executed and reasonable? Does the study have ecological validity2 and yet 
go beyond restating the obvious in respect of what managers already know?  
                                                     
2 Ecological validity should not be confused with external validity. Ecological validity indicates the degree 
to which findings of a research study can be generalised to real-life settings, often because they are collected or 
generated in real-life settings (e.g. actual employees trying to solve real work tasks) (Brewer, 2000). Although this 
form of validity—unlike internal and external validity—is not strictly required for a study to be valid, it is a 
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Although we cannot fully describe what good security and privacy research is, we can easily 
describe what it is not. Although every study suffers from trade-offs and limitations and one or two key 
weaknesses, a weak study suffers from several limiting factors, all of compound to create the universally 
dreaded (albeit sometimes imaginary) ‘fatal flaws’. A weak study will likely exhibit one or more of the 
characteristics summarised in Table 2, typically in multiple combinations. Here, we focus on factors we 
believe are especially pertinent to organisational security and privacy research, although many of these 
factors and solutions apply in other contexts. We also follow the EJIS principle of embracing the best of a 
diversity of genres (Te'eni et al., 2015). 
Table 2. Indicators of a Potentially Weak Security/Privacy Study and Possible Solutions 
Category Indicator of Weakness Solution 
Contribution A lack of face validity or 
ecological validity in the 
results such that they are not 
useful or violate common 
sense in practice 
 
We argue that ecological validity (e.g. realism) (Brewer, 2000) 
is especially pertinent for security and privacy research, 
because for such research to have meaningful influence, its 
corresponding solutions should work effectively with actual 
people in real organisations.  
Contribution A sense that the findings are 
‘obvious’ and already 
known (Rai, 2017) 
Rather than starting security/privacy studies based on gap-
spotting the literature (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) or 
applying a known theory in a new context, focus more on a 
controversial, pressing problem in research or practice (Rai, 
2017). 
Contribution A sense that the problem is 
‘made up’ or not pressing 
(Rai, 2017) 
This typically occurs as a result of gap-spotting the literature 
(Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) to find problem opportunities 
without consideration of the living academic community or 
practice community. The easiest solution is to take a more 
engaged scholarship approach, that is, to bring together the 
scholarly literature, discussions with scholarly experts, and 
connections with practice to identify problems that are real and 
pressing (Van de Ven, 2007). True engaged scholarship 
follows this principle not just in problem identification but in 
theory building, construct and measurement development, data 
collection, and interpretation of findings. 
Contribution Results that seem 
implausible or overly 
‘convenient’ 
Provide transparency on pilot tests, theory development, and 
instrumentation development, and avoid model trimming (e.g. 
dropping constructs and relationships that are insignificant in a 
large model) unless it is done under the direction of a 
knowledgeable review team and for the purpose of theoretical 
parsimony. Nonetheless, any such directed trimming should be 
documented to better support future replications, meta-
analyses, and scientific transparency. 
Methodology Building new measures 
solely from the literature 
Practice engaged scholarship within communities of practice 
and research in measurement development (Van de Ven, 
2007). 
                                                     
particularly meaningful but often overlooked consideration for research areas that are highly intertwined with 
practice, such as security and privacy research. 
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Methodology Focusing on intentions or 
hypothetical vignettes alone 
Where possible, gather self-reported or actual observed 
security/privacy behaviours (e.g. Keith et al., 2013; Boss et al., 
2015). Triangulate an intentions study with behaviour data or 
secondary data. Use vignettes for proof-of-concept and then 
follow up with field experiment. 
Methodology Lack of true control and 
treatment groups 
Even in field research, use controls and treatments to establish 
causation (Boss et al., 2015; Johnston et al., 2015). 
Methodology Paper-based, one-off, cross-
sectional study 
Longitudinal data collections; use of electronic instead of 
paper-based data-collection methods to improve data quality 
(Lowry et al., 2016a); use of mixed methods (e.g. self-report 
with secondary data). 
Methodology Student sampling or 
sampling from one 
organisation 
Sampling from multiple organisations or through leading 
online panels (Lowry et al., 2016a).  
Methodology Overreliance on self-
reported measurement 
Triangulation of self-report measurement with objective, 
observed measurement of actual security/privacy behaviours in 
which the participants do not know they are being observed 
(Keith et al., 2013; Keith et al., 2015); multilevel measurement 
involving self-report and report by one’s manager or peers 
(Hsu et al., 2015); use of secondary datasets for additional 
organisational-level measurement (Kwon & Johnson, 2014). 
Theory Amalgamations of theory 
mixed in with seemingly 
random constructs that are 
put together into what the 
authors call a theoretical 
model (Hassan & Lowry, 
2015) 
 
Although IS researchers certainly need not be beholden to 
established theories, and should definitely create new 
sociotechnical theories to explain the science of the artificial 
(Simon, 1996), these still need to have a coherent underlying 
story, involving related and meaningful causal mechanisms 
(Hassan & Lowry, 2015).  
Theory Questionable measurement, 
construct validity, and 
content validity (Bagozzi et 
al., 1991) 
 
We consider this a theory problem, because constructs come 
from theory, and measurements should be chosen to properly 
represent the actual meaning of the constructs (Bagozzi et al., 
1991). Otherwise, a study will suffer from lack of content or 
construct validity, and thus the empirical data will not properly 
test the underlying theory. 
Theory Weakly applied theorisation 
in which theory is loosely 
borrowed without due 
consideration to its 
underlying assumptions and 
without properly re-
contextualising it (Whetten 
et al., 2009) 
 
Many opportunities still exist to borrow and adapt key theories 
from reference disciplines, such as criminology and sociology. 
Indeed, good theorising is highly contextualised (e.g. Whetten 
et al., 2009), and this is especially true in security and privacy 
research (e.g. Boss et al., 2015; Wall et al., 2016). However, 
before adapting and modifying a theory, it is crucial to 
understand its boundary conditions, assumptions, constructs, 
and casual mechanisms. In doing so, researchers can thus better 
explain, justify, and motivate adaptations that are different 
from the originals as well as demonstrate why they are useful. 
 
Pointedly, we admit to publishing research that suffers from some of the above weaknesses. In 
fact, many researchers are ‘coerced’ into these narratives as a matter of pre-tenure survival. But what we 
have found is that research that goes beyond these simple approaches tends to be better received at top 
journals and has more impact. We have especially noticed in security and privacy research a tendency 
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among authors to push ideas out to journals quickly3 and to perhaps over focus on preliminary-style 
studies involving intentions with self-report cross-sectional surveys. Although this is certainly a valid 
approach, especially when exploring a new topic area or for mere career survival—after all, many of us 
live in a publish-or-perish paradigm in which we do not have the luxury of refining a theory for 10 
years—we find this to be an increasingly limited approach to making meaningful contributions in a 
mature area of research. We believe that, as any area matures, the more effective way to contribute to 
science (and then survive by publishing in top journals) is to enhance the novelty or rigor of the methods, 
the novelty or explanatory power of the theory, and the novelty of the research questions. 
For example, it is particularly easy to conduct a factorial survey method study using Amazon 
Mechanical Turk participants examine participants’ intentions to comply with their company’s ISPs. By 
contrast, it is particularly difficult to conduct such a study in an ecologically valid setting in which 
participants across hundreds of organisations are tracked for their ISP compliance (not just through self-
report but perhaps through automated report or report from their supervisors) in a longitudinal study. 
Although the latter approach is indeed more difficult (and impossible in many settings), it can provide 
more ecological validity—by showing how employees’ cognitions and behaviours change over time, how 
effective training interventions develop over time, how to better interact with day-to-day organisational 
practice, and so on.  
However, we recommend the use of common sense in judging the level of evidence required for a 
given security/privacy study. To be fair, there is a big difference between studying illegal behaviour and 
noncompliance/compliance behaviour. As a rule, organisations will not allow the study of illegal 
behaviour, whereas they will more frequently allow the study of noncompliance/compliance behaviour. 
Some problems are so ‘wicked’ they present serious legal challenges to organisations—and even create 
                                                     
3 To help address this issue, the Dewald Roode Workshop in Information Systems Security Research was 
started in 2009, as sponsored by IFIP WG 8.11 / 11.13, to help security and privacy researchers prepare articles for 
submission to top journals. Likewise, the AIS sponsors SIG-SEC, which hosts key security/privacy workshops 
before top AIS conferences, such as ICIS. We urge the security/privacy community to leverage such opportunities 
before submitting to journal, and at a minimum to circulate manuscripts among their colleagues. 
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liabilities for researchers—and thus can be studied only through intentions, surrogate measures, or 
secondary data. Conversely, because many organisations have enhanced their auditing and risk 
management practices, they are increasingly providing opportunities to study actual compliance 
behaviour. Thus, researchers are starting to work with organisations and third parties to conduct 
penetration testing, simulate phishing attacks, and the like. These are compelling data-collection 
opportunities.  
In the remainder of this section, we further illustrate specific improvements that can be made with 
a couple of in-depth illustrations that we believe can dramatically improve security and privacy research. 
First, we challenge the notion of loose re-contextualisation that has gained prominence in this field of 
study and provide an example of DT research. Second, we provide an illustration of how the focus on 
intentions has undermined the use of powerful theories in security and privacy research, because the 
theories were designed to explain phenomena other than intentions. In the next section, we continue to lay 
out a promising agenda for new avenues of security and privacy research. 
3.1 Improving the ‘Contextualisation’ of Reference Theories: The Example of Deterrence Theory 
Like every other scientific field, IS research has strengthened and expanded its theoretical 
foundations by applying reference theories and associated concepts and from other fields. For example, in 
explaining employees’ abuse of computer and information resources, a number of papers in IS security 
research have drawn theories from the field of criminology. This exercise has brought significant 
contributions and new perspectives to IS security research. Where better to gain insights into criminal 
behaviour than from a field that places the understanding of offender behaviour centre-stage?  
From a security perspective, DT was first applied by Straub (1990). Many exemplary papers have 
since examined criminal internal computer abuse (ICA) (e.g. Harrington, 1996; Peace et al., 2003; Lee et 
al., 2004; Workman, 2007; Hu et al., 2011; Posey et al., 2011; Lowry et al., 2014; Lowry et al., 2015; 
Willison et al., 2017). Whereas some studies have focused only on criminal behaviour, others have 
investigated noncriminal behaviour as well (e.g. Siponen et al., 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009b, 2009a; 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Son, 2011; Chen et al., 2013). Thus, in our example of improving 
14 
 
contextualisation, we consider the use of DT for criminal and noncriminal settings, and possibly a mix of 
the two.  
As we attempt to uncover exciting research opportunities by re-contextualising theories from 
other disciplines, it may be good to start by going back and asking ourselves what exactly we mean by 
‘re-contextualisation’. Whetten et al. (2009) and Boss et al. (2015) suggested that proper re-
contextualisation involves more than merely adapting the measures associated with a theory to a new 
context; it involves a critical understanding of how the assumptions of a theory might work in a new 
context and making carefully documented and supported adaptations, as necessary. DT provides an 
excellent illustration of this opportunity. With its origins in criminology, DT asserts that in committing a 
crime, a potential offender will consider the costs associated with legal punishment. More specifically, if 
the chances of being caught are high (i.e. sanction certainty), the associated penalties severe (i.e. sanction 
severity), and the punishment swift (i.e. sanction celerity), then the potential offender will be dissuaded 
from committing the crime.  
A focal point in the seminal DT writings of Bentham (1988), Beccaria (2009), Andenaes (1952), 
Becker (1968), and Gibbs (1975) is the potential deterrence effect of the criminal justice system. Some 
criminologists would thus likely question extending DT to noncriminal contexts.  
However, we believe that DT could potentially be fully re-contextualised to noncriminal contexts, 
given that the assumptions and boundary conditions of DT are clearly and transparently laid out. Theorists 
could thus use further logic, evidence, and metaphors to carefully explain and justify the use of DT in 
noncriminal contexts. Accordingly, this could be an excellent opportunity for security and privacy 
researchers to fully rework and reshape DT and establish theoretical ownership over a different version of 
DT that is fully contextualised. This kind of re-contextualization was advocated by Whetten et al. (2009) 
and painstakingly demonstrated by Wall et al. (2016) in an organisational security/privacy theory-
building paper. In that respect, an excellent research opportunity would be for security and privacy 
researchers to explain how and why organisational sanctions in an organisational security context can act 
as effective and are legitimate replacements of the formal criminal justice system in classical DT models. 
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Likewise, it would be important to better understand what kinds of non-legal formal and informal 
sanctions work best with various kinds of security/privacy behaviours, and again, why. 
Another compelling departure from the criminological strictures of DT has been the use of DT to 
examine positive behaviour in the form of employee compliance with organisational information security 
policies (e.g. Siponen et al., 2007; Herath & Rao, 2009b, 2009a; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Son, 2011; Chen 
et al., 2013). Such studies have offered fascinating empirical evidence, and this evidence is contrary to 
what criminologists would expect. A further contribution of security and privacy research could be to 
conduct more studies to explain why DT works so well in promoting positive behaviours and what the 
limitations may be. Here, we thus see the conversation as just starting. 
3.2 Moving away from Intentions, When It Is Feasible 
With the aim of reorienting IT adoption research, Benbasat & Barki (2007) offered their views in 
a paper entitled ‘Quo vadis, TAM’? As the title suggests, their concerns related to the technology 
acceptance model (TAM) (Davis et al., 1989). Although Benbasat and Barki acknowledged the success of 
TAM, they also maintained that it has produced several ‘dysfunctional outcomes’. What is interesting 
about these outcomes is how many of them have also occurred in security and privacy research. Although 
TAM has not been widely applied in security and privacy research, the common denominator between 
TAM and our field is the intentions construct. We thus note the greater opportunity for security and 
privacy research to move beyond the intentions construct in an attempt to study actual behaviour and to 
better understand the decision-making process related to security/privacy behaviours.  
To illustrate this opportunity, we consider studies that have focused on ICA. The extent to which 
the actions under investigation can be considered ‘abusive’ varies from paper to paper, with some studies 
addressing relatively benign behaviour and others more malicious. Some of the studies involve intentions, 
and some involve reported behaviours or actual observed behaviours.4 A key opportunity in all of these is 
                                                     
4 Some ICA studies have effectively used scenarios in a bid to ‘place’ respondents in a lifelike situation 
(e.g. D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2011; Willison et al., 2017) where they do not have to admit directly to illegal 
behaviour. These are certainly useful approaches for understanding such behaviour, but such scenarios underplay the 
influence of offenders’ skills and abilities, the context in which they work, and the relationship between them. 
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to further delve into a person’s decision-making process for security/privacy violations or compliance. 
For example, criminological research has acknowledged that offenders make a series of choices in the 
criminal decision-making process (Blumstein et al., 1988; Hagan, 1997; Sampson & Laub, 2005). 
Namely, the rational choice perspective advanced by Clarke & Cornish (1985) posits that offenders make 
a series of choices related to specific stages of the criminal decision-making process. Do these arguments 
apply to ICA, and do they apply to noncriminal decisions such as those related to security policy 
compliance/noncompliance? This question points to rich re-contextualisation and methodological 
opportunities for security and privacy researchers. 
Aside from noting the absence of research into the motivations of ICA or noncriminal policy 
violation, we also believe that the current approach of examining intentions as a proxy for behaviour in 
security and privacy research may be too limiting. When considering the organisational context, we can 
follow the example of the criminology theories, including environmental criminology (Brantingham & 
Brantingham, 1991), routine activity theory (Felson, 1994), and the rational choice perspective (Clarke & 
Cornish, 1985), which have shown that potential criminal opportunities also depend on the offender’s 
skills and abilities required to perform the crime, the offender’s knowledge of potential safeguards, and 
other factors. For example, an accountant in an organisation will have the skills and access necessary for 
electronic bookkeeping. Through a knowledge of security vulnerabilities, the employee, if motivated, may 
decide to perpetrate fraud. However, a member of the marketing department would be unlikely to have 
access to the bookkeeping system or the ability to perform a similar crime. However, the marketing 
employee may have access to customer data, which could equally be misused or defrauded. This example 
demonstrates that what constitutes an ICA opportunity for an employee in one department may not 
constitute such an opportunity for a member of a different department. Likewise, there likely exists an 
intentions–behaviour gap in respect of security/policy compliance behaviour as well. It is easy to ‘intend’ 
positive behaviour, but actual compliance can take substantial effort, which can undermine one’s work 
productivity or create other costly nuisances. 
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To be clear, there are good justifications for using intentions data in research, especially in newer 
areas of security and privacy research or in cases where it is the only feasible way to gather data (e.g. 
studies of highly illegal behaviour). We also recognise that organisation-level security/privacy data is 
among the data most difficult to gather, such that most organisations refuse access to such information, 
especially for criminal violations. We thus see studies of behavioural organisational security/privacy more 
as a ‘Holy Grail’ or aspirational goal for security and privacy research than as a required standard. 
Nonetheless, actual behavioural data can be easier to gather in other settings, such as with consumers’ use 
of smartphones, social networking studies, and the like. We simply encourage researchers to strive to use 
the best sources they can and to think outside the box—but we also encourage editors and reviewers to be 
thoughtful and realistic in their expectations for empirical evidence. 
4. PROMISING FUTURE RESEARCH: SECURITY AND PRIVACY AT THE CENTRE 
OF THE IS ARTEFACT 
Turning from a more critical review of how we can improve what we are already doing in 
security and privacy research, we now take a more positive view by laying out unexploited, exciting 
opportunities that put security and privacy at the centre of the IS artefact by focusing on (1) online 
platforms, (2) the IoT, and (3) big data. Importantly, these three often intersect and thus further 
complicate security/privacy issues. 
4.1 Opportunities in Online Platforms 
We believe that online platform markets represent one of the bigger IT transformations that has 
occurred since the emergence of the Internet (cf. Parker et al., 2017; Song et al., 2017). These markets are 
obliterating traditional e-commerce, retail, and supply chains. The key to their emergence is the 
interesting delivery of core economic principles related to demand-side economics, supply-side 
economics, and network economies of scale and scope. Platforms have arisen because the market 
‘increasingly favours orchestration [of third-party content providers] over [in-house] production’ (Parker 
et al., 2017, p. 255). Likewise, platforms are more likely to enable economies of scale (Krishnan & 
Gupta, 2001; Bakos & Katsamakas, 2008). As a result, we have new kinds of interconnected technologies 
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and business models that are based on platforms, and platform-based businesses are among the most 
profitable on the planet (e.g. Google, Amazon, Taobao, Tencent, Uber, Facebook, Apple, 
AirBnB).Consider the degree to which Amazon has affected retail markets throughout the world. Amazon 
provides a platform-based, fully integrated service that allows for the delivery of over 50 million items in 
free two-hour, same-day, or two-day delivery schemes. No physical store can compete with such selection 
and velocity. As a result, major traditional retailers have been forced to respond and adapt at a fast pace, 
and some (e.g. Walmart) have raced to create their own platforms. Those that have not (e.g. Macys, 
Nordstrom, Aeropostale, Sears Holdings Corporation—owner of K-Mart) are facing dire consequences.5 
Clearly, we are moving to a platform-based world. However, the race to create and implement these 
online platforms has provided little time to consider unintended caveats and risks when it comes to both 
security and privacy. The complexity of these systems is significantly greater than the systems we have 
known before because of the scale and scope of their interactions (Burns et al., 2017a). Consider the 
inventory and shipping complexity of Amazon’s 50 million distinct stock keeping units. For leading 
platforms to work well, they must tie together massive supply chains throughout the world, with larger, 
more heterogeneous groups of customers than was possible before. To win, online platforms need 
massive scale and scope, with network effects that dramatically drive down marginal costs (Armstrong, 
2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2006). It is troubling to the status quo that the market favours natural monopolies 
and ‘tips’ toward platforms of the largest economies of scale and scope, which have huge network effects, 
resulting in ‘winner-take-all’ markets (Liu et al., 2011). But this kind of complexity, scale, and size 
makes for systems that have even greater vulnerabilities to security and privacy issues. They are also 
greater targets for external and internal threats. Attackers may concentrate their efforts on the few 
organisations in the world that can win at the ‘winner-take-all’ platforms. If the attackers are successful, 
the organisations and the consumers can suffer significant losses in terms of security and privacy. If a 
critical point is reached, an irreversible erosion of consumer trust in these platforms can set in, driving 
                                                     
5 To wit, given the platform revolution’s disruption on traditional retailers, Forbes recently boldly declared, 
‘Traditional retail might not be dead, but it is in a coffin’ (Lavin, 2017). 
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down consumer willingness to transact on them. The September 2017 Equifax breach represents such a 
worse-case scenario, in which hackers continually focused on a treasure trove of private information until 
they were successful. 
Such platforms also facilitate the use of new transaction technologies, especially e-payment, 
which have disrupted the natural order of banks acting as middle-men for payment transactions. These 
also create new privacy, security, and trust relationships (Tsiakis & Sthephanides, 2005; Kim et al., 
2010). For example, consumers can disintermediate traditional banks and pay directly through Alipay™, 
WeChat Pay™, PayPal™, Apple Wallet™, Google Wallet™, and so on. Such disintermediation further 
fosters online platforms, and it exposes consumers and governments to new security/privacy risks, 
especially as untraceable cyber/crypto currencies emerge, such as bitcoin, as facilitated by block chain 
technology (Karame, 2016; Underwood, 2016). 
Following news and social media, consumers have become increasingly aware of the security 
risks and the massive personal data collection and data sharing conducted by these platforms. 
Furthermore, they have come to the realisation that we are all vulnerable and it is increasingly difficult to 
opt out of this global system or for any of our activities to remain private. This is especially true as natural 
monopolies and oligopolies are formed. Who, for example, can opt out of Google Scholar™ and stay 
abreast of the latest research? Consequently, any consumer and organisation will have to worry not only 
about home-grown systems, but about the system at large as well. A Walmart supplier is vulnerable to 
Walmart and its thousands of other interconnected suppliers. Google is embedded in one form or another 
in most of the world’s systems, whether by mobile phone, search, email, GPS and mapping, or storage 
technology. The 2013 Target data breach, which affecting 41 million customers, may be a worst-case 
example here. This was a platform-based breach, based on a successful phishing email to a third-party 
system. Based on information from the third party, hackers gained access to Target’s customer service 
database, on which they installed spyware that captured highly private customer data.  
Consequently, online platforms provide rich opportunities for research, particularly in terms of 
shedding serious academic light on the security and privacy issues. It is challenging to be more specific, 
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because the research ideas and creativity of the IS community are boundless. Nevertheless, solid 
academic studies on security and privacy in online platforms are sure to be impactful and increasingly 
compelling. 
4.2 Opportunities in the Internet of Things 
Like online platforms, the IoT, which is the internetworking of various physical devices, is 
rewriting all the rules we once had about organisational security and privacy. We now live in a world in 
which there are more automatic ‘things’ than there are people. Hence, the IoT will naturally extend 
platforms, dramatically complicating the underlying security and privacy issues. Unfortunately for IT 
security and privacy professionals, these ‘things’ are multiplying exponentially. Bring your own device 
(BYOD) initiatives have already become a security and privacy nightmare for organisations (French et 
al., 2014; Garba et al., 2015). The IoT entails the same nightmare as BYOD, but exponentially increased. 
This is particularly true because the key to most of this internetworking is an architecture of wireless 
transmitters and sensors that will connect into vast global, networks. These range from the smallest of 
transmitters and passive RFID chips to directly wired applications such as home automation apps. Hence, 
the IoT affects everything from online platforms and wearable technologies to automated cars and planes. 
Accordingly, the IoT is progressing much more rapidly than are security and privacy standards, causing 
many gaping security holes (Singh et al., 2015), especially because security/privacy policies are often 
engineered after the fact. For one, there are conflicting communication protocols, each of which has its 
own security loopholes. For another, current organisational practices for managing security, such as the 
use of firewalls, routers, and gateways, simply do not work for smaller and more mobile ‘things’. The IoT 
gives even more creative and nefarious opportunities for hackers that were not possible before, such as 
spying on someone through their refrigerator, listening to someone through their smartphone, turning off 
a home thermostat to cause the pipes to freeze and burst overnight, attacking someone’s pacemaker or 
insulin pump (Burns et al., 2016), unlocking the Bluetooth locks for households,6 suddenly locking a 
                                                     
6 Bluetooth is especially prone to ‘man-in-the-middle attacks’ because of security flaws of the Bluetooth 
protocol itself. Hackers can easily intercept the transmitted data and can spoof device behaviour for authentication. 
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car’s brakes at high speed, sending a drone into traffic, and so on. In fact, such destructive possibilities 
may forever change the security profession such that many security professionals will have to act in roles 
of deception and counterintelligence to stay ahead of attacks.  
As indicated by the examples discussed above, through the IoT, the physical security and well-
being of people and their homes are increasingly tied to the network and information system’s health and 
security. Hence, information security and privacy breaches are no longer abstract notions or a danger only 
for big organisations or for remote personal data sitting somewhere in a database. Rather, these breaches 
increasingly hit consumers in their homes and daily lives (e.g. smartphones). We can easily imagine the 
apocalyptic security/privacy consequences of breaching a network of millions of smart automobiles 
speaking to each other and to traffic sensors through a mesh of sensor networks and other ‘smart’ devices. 
Even if no breach occurs, the sheer amount of data gathered from IoT devices may concern 
consumers. MIT professor Alex Pentland noted in his interview with the Harvard Business Review staff 
(Berinato, 2014) that even the data points by which people’s daily behaviour is gathered may make 
people feel invaded. ‘As sensors are built into more and more products, there’s a sense of being 
increasingly spied on’ (p. 102). The IoT’s vulnerability to security/privacy attacks and even life-
threatening breaches on individuals’ systems or data can affect virtually everyone. Thus, as the use of the 
IoT matures, we expect a societal wave of changes in terms of how people think about using networked 
devices and applications and who controls the data. If the use of the IoT turns out to be disaster prone, 
with people dying as a result, there will be calls to shut down the IoT, with drastic regulations passed 
overnight (Pentland, in Berinato, 2014). Thus, the IoT is the ultimate example of the IS artefact vs the IT 
artefact argument: whereas most technologists are excited about the creative technical possibilities the 
IoT can bring to our lives, only the social and organisational scientists, with consistent and disciplined 
                                                     
Hence, all Bluetooth-enabled devices, from locks to smart watches and medical instruments, are highly susceptible 
to attacks. A large number of academic studies have confirmed such holes and suggested remedies (Hager & 
MidKiff, 2003; Haataja & Toivanen, 2010), but the devices continue to be exploited because of the protocol’s 
fundamental design. 
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‘systems’ thinking, can, when ‘things’ go awry, thoroughly and deeply reveal the technologies–policies–
processes–people–society–economy–legislature chain of cause and effect.  
4.3 Opportunities in Big Data 
We now live in a world in which we are overwhelmed with data, and data is increasingly needed 
for strategic advantage. As a result of the data-gathering capabilities of platforms and the IoT, 
technological and business advances in data aggregation and business intelligence (Chen et al., 2012), and 
changing societal and cultural norms that favour the sharing of personal information, this data is 
increasingly ‘big’. It is generated in ever-increasing volumes, at increasing speed, and in increasing 
variety (e.g. text, sound, video, blog). Because of the massive size of this data, it often cannot be stored on 
traditional corporate servers, but instead requires increasingly massive, outsourced server farms in what is 
commonly referred to as ‘the cloud’. In reality, these are simply data centres run by third parties, which 
usually serve many other parties—dramatically increasing the potential for security and privacy leaks, in 
addition to the threats associated with traditional vulnerabilities. This is especially true because once data 
is opened up outside internal firewalls, many traditional security and privacy approaches do not work 
(Moura & Serrão, 2016). For example, it becomes much more difficult to monitor and control the flow of 
data, especially as it goes into third-party hands or crosses national borders, thus involving international 
law, which may or may not agree with national laws regarding jurisdiction, the nature of the crime, and 
the ‘rights’ of victims.  
From a privacy perspective, it is now easy to de-anonymise a person using triangulated data from 
multiple sources (De Montjoye et al., 2015), and data aggregators are doing exactly that. In creating 
detailed, highly accurate profiles without ever interacting with the person (Davenport et al., 2007), they 
also create new, ever-challenging security and privacy issues. And it is difficult to stay abreast of them 
all. For example, how do we enforce encryption of big data that is so massive it is stored in a clustered 
database across multiple servers, which may not even be geographically collocated? How do we carefully 
transmit such data without exposing our organisations to great vulnerabilities, when the Internet was not 
designed for that kind of volume? Up to what point will people stay ‘compliant’ and agree to have their 
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data and behaviour gathered and aggregated by organisations and governments throughout the world? 
More frequently than before, incidents of corporate or government misuse of data get reported in the 
news. These, along with reports of large information leaks and data breaches, have raised public 
awareness about the power of data, how personal information is used by businesses and governments, and 
how often it may fall into the wrong hands. It is possible to expect a change of heart in terms of 
participation in the global information community, which has been so painstakingly and so diligently built 
in the name of technological and societal progress. 
As is the case with online platforms and the IoT, big data–processing technologies advance faster 
than the more comprehensive and wholesome chain of systems that preserve information security and 
privacy (technologies–policies–processes–people–society–economy–legislature), resulting in an increased 
variety and velocity of vulnerabilities (i.e. the speed at which vulnerabilities appear). Each link of this 
chain needs the attention of researchers, and thankfully, big data analytics could offer solutions here. For 
example, big data analytics could be leveraged for the modelling and simulation of resilient supply chains 
and platforms whose design would limit threat likelihood. Another important contribution of the research 
in this area is the shaping of organisational and government policies and legislation by identifying 
baselines and best practices as well as by improving the understanding of human behaviour. As Pentland 
suggested, ‘Companies don’t own the data, and that without rules defining who does, consumers will 
revolt, regulators will swoop down, and the [IoT] will fail to reach its potential’ (Berinato, 2014, p. 101). 
We are already seeing these trends in the European Union (EU), which is introducing challenging legal 
and social artefacts that are affecting many organisations throughout the world.7 
  
                                                     
7 The EU’s forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) gives more rights back to consumers, 
streamlines regulations related to international business, and protects customers in the EU regardless of where the 
headquarters of the Internet company is located, and thus will dramatically impact many organisations throughout 
the world. This regulation goes into effect in May 2018 and has some substantial societal and organisation-level 
privacy/security implications. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this essay, we outlined some important issues in the hope of moving information security and 
privacy research forward and enhancing its impact. We discussed the need to re-examine our 
understanding of IT and IS artefacts and to expand the range of the latter to include those artificial 
phenomena that are crucial to information security and privacy research. We then briefly discussed and 
suggested remedies for some common limitations in theory, methodology, and contributions that are 
bound to weaken a security/privacy study and jeopardise its chances of publication in top IS journals. We 
illustrated specific improvements that can be made with a couple of in-depth examples that we believe 
can improve security and privacy research. We challenged the notion of loose re-contextualisation that 
has gained a foothold in this research area and discussed the example of DT research. We then provided 
an illustration of how the focus on intentions has undermined the use of powerful theories in security and 
privacy research, because the theories were designed to capture more than intentions. Finally, we outlined 
three promising opportunities for IS research that should be particularly compelling to security and 
privacy researchers: online platforms, the IoT, and big data. All of these carry innate information security 
and privacy risks and vulnerabilities that can be addressed only by researching each link of the systems 
chain, that is, technologies–policies–processes–people–society–economy–legislature. 
In closing, we introduce the papers in this special issue on security and privacy. Importantly, 
these were chosen by us and by the EJIS editorial team because they demonstrate one or more of the 
points outlined above and, as such, could make significant contributions to IS security and privacy 
research.  
Moody et al. (2017) present a large-scale experimental study that aims to determine the effect of 
situational and personality factors on individuals’ susceptibility to phishing attacks. By explicating 
underlying theories, the researchers build their model and empirically test it by tracking subjects’ actual 
clicking behaviour. They further explain the likelihood that an individual will fall victim to a phishing 
attack.  
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In Posey et al. (2017), the authors use advanced data-mining techniques to conduct breach 
analysis and build a taxonomy of eight major types of personally identifiable information breaches that 
are currently typical for US organisations. They detail differences in exposure to the breaches and their 
severity. Like Moody et al. (2017), this study has implications for both theory and practice, and it could 
be used to create a baseline for the different types of attacks across the United States and across 
organisations.  
Cram et al. (2017) provide an innovative literature review of studies on organisational 
information security policies. By reviewing and categorising 76 influential journal articles on security 
policy, the authors identify core relationships examined in the literature and propose a revised conceptual 
model that compiles the core construct relationships and provides further theoretical perspectives and 
insights. This manuscript alone should provide a substantial foundation for future research.  
Ozdemir et al. (2017) argue that privacy threats have thus far been understood as originating 
mainly from organisations. Their study challenges this common narrative and instead investigates threats 
to privacy that result from the misuse of data by social media peers. The authors discuss information 
privacy and the relevant factors in relation to both institutional and peer contexts and discuss the 
differences between them in respect of antecedents and consequences. 
Algarni et al. (2017) investigate social engineering victimisation on social networking sites, 
Facebook in particular. They analyse users’ susceptibility to social engineering victimisation and how it is 
impacted by the source characteristics on Facebook (such as number of friends, number of posts, common 
beliefs, good looks, etc.) and source credibility perceptions (such as perceived sincerity, perceived 
competence, perceived attraction, and perceived worthiness). Such studies of victimisation can help 
prevent these kinds of abuses in practice. 
Finally, Karwatzki et al. (2017) examine the perceived adverse consequences of information 
disclosure by organisations. Through a focus group study, they develop a categorisation of the 
consequences of information disclosure and investigate the role of the organisations in each category. As 
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a contribution to practice, the authors offer mitigation mechanisms with which organisations can address 
consequences according to category. 
Together, our essay and these ground-breaking papers point to a future of compelling research in 
security and privacy research. 
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